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A B S T R A C T   
Based on a narrative analysis of 20 naturally occurring clinical consultations between general practitioners and 
patients in England, sourced from the One in a million data archive, we explore how they conceptualize and 
negotiate medical and existential uncertainty. To capture the interactional element, which is often overlooked, 
three consultations receive special attention. While exploring the ongoing dynamics of the moment-to-moment 
realization of negotiations, we relate their actions to the institutionalized positions of doctor and patient. Situ-
ating their negotiations in the sociocultural context in which their interaction is embedded reveals how con-
sultations unfold as a result of communication between two different positions in a normatively structured 
system. When uncertainty prevails, both patients and GPs mainly conceptualize uncertainty indirectly. By 
conceptualizing uncertainty indirectly and in a depersonalized manner, GPs manage to safeguard against clinical 
errors without compromising their authority and credibility. Contrary to medical uncertainty, which is contin-
uously discussed, existential uncertainty usually recedes in the background. However, as our consultations un-
fold it becomes evident that medical and existential dimensions of uncertainty are inextricably linked. By 
acknowledging that clinical uncertainty is not only an epistemic concern but also an existential one, existential 
aspects may usefully rise to the surface.   
1. Introduction 
In this article, we undertake a sociological exploration of how pa-
tients and general practitioners (GPs) negotiate medical and existential 
uncertainty in clinical encounters. Empirically, our point of departure is 
verbatim transcripts of 20 naturally occurring consultations between 
patients and GPs in England, sourced from a corpus of 212 consultations 
from the One in a Million: Primary Care Consultations Archive (Barnes, 
2017; Jepson et al., 2017). Our main aim is to narratively explore the 
ways in which negotiations of perceived illness-related uncertainties are 
carried out in situ between GPs and patients. While doing so, we aim to 
identify how the two actors seek, obtain, exchange and interpret rele-
vant information; how they conceptualize uncertainty; and how they 
decide how to deal with it. This includes exploring patient agency, and 
whether or not the two parties align to and build on each other’s ut-
terances. Finally, we explore how GPs, in the face of uncertainty, deal 
with the challenging juxtaposition between patient-centered care and 
medical responsibility (Dowrick, 1999), and how they balance being 
candid about uncertainty against risking their authority and credibility. 
1.1. Medical and existential uncertainty 
Clinical medicine is rife with uncertainty, and all medical encounters 
revolve around things we do not know (Mackintosh and Armstrong, 
2020). Perceptions of these uncertainties encompass experiences of 
wondering, being insecure or worrying about something hypothetical 
that might or might not be or become. When uncertain situations involve 
known probabilities, we are dealing with risk (Douglas, 2003). When 
risks are unknown, “there is no longer a particular risk but an uncer-
tainty” (Zinn, 2009:512). In other words: risk always involves uncer-
tainty, but uncertainty does not always involve risk. 
Uncertainty in clinical encounters involves both medical and exis-
tential dimensions. The medical dimensions relate to limitations in 
biomedical knowledge, which leads to a lack of certainty concerning 
diagnostic, etiological and prognostic issues (Bhise et al., 2017). This 
curtails doctors’ ability to identify, explain and treat patients’ ailments, 
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and to predict future developments (Helou, 2020). Movements towards 
evidence-based medicine are intended to increase the likelihood of 
healthcare interventions being informed by robust research, but even 
when evidence exists: “prediction, however reliable in the aggregate, is 
notoriously uncertain at the local or individual level” (Montgomery--
Hunter, 1991:28). Scientific, technological and clinical advances might 
alter the contours of uncertainty, but they do not drive it away (Fox, 
2000). 
Whereas medical uncertainty is a lack of certainty due to the limits of 
medical knowledge, uncertainties of being are existential preconditions. 
Illness is a life-changing experience that might lead us to articulate 
existential questions more explicitly and experience existential uncer-
tainty more profoundly (Carel, 2013; Gulbrandsen et al., 2016). Time is 
a prime dimension here: Existential uncertainty relates to our awareness 
that our future is open and – by definition – undetermined. Uncertainties 
of being can undermine the taken-for-granted sense of things and 
dominate illness experiences: “The familiarity of our lifeworld […] is 
always pervaded by a homelessness: This is my world, but it is also at the 
same time not entirely mine, I do not fully know it or control it. […] The 
basic alienness of my being-in-the-world, which in health is always in 
the process of receding into the background, breaks forth in illness to 
pervade existence” (Svenaeus, 2000:93). In people’s life-worlds, medi-
cal and existential uncertainty are inseparable (Adamson, 1997). 
The ways in which we perceive and conceptualize uncertainty are 
inherently culturally contingent (Douglas, 2003; Mackintosh and Arm-
strong, 2020). In a context where belief in scientific knowledge has 
replaced beliefs in God, destiny or fate, there can be less tolerance of, 
and greater awareness of, uncertainty (Beck, 1992). Scientific de-
velopments and increasing instrumental rationalization encompass a 
process of disenchantment (entzauberung) of the world. In a disen-
chanted world, people generally believe that there are principally “no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one 
can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber, 1946:139). 
Or perhaps better: we want and expect it to be. People who seek pro-
fessional help for their illnesses are no exception. These are key features 
of the cultural context in which negotiations of uncertainty between 
patients and GPs are conducted. 
1.2. Previous research 
Qualitative studies based on interactional data of how uncertainty is 
actually dealt with in clinical consultations are scarce (Bhise et al., 
2017). When clinical encounters are studied, the main focus is often on 
doctors; how their actions affect patients’ views, and how they best can 
achieve desired outcomes (Cousin et al., 2013; Tai-Seale et al., 2012). 
Many studies are limited to specific consultation aspects and specific 
patient groups, with limited general applicability (Bhise et al., 2017). 
Uncertainty is rarely defined, and often operationalized differently 
(Bhise et al., 2017; Han et al., 2019). Studies are often based on hypo-
thetical designs (interview and survey data) and experimental methods 
(vignettes and simulated consultations), i.e., detached from clinical 
situations, and on quantified data. This kind of data do not capture the 
inherited qualitative interactional nature of doctor-patient encounters. 
The current body of research reveals a mosaic of different findings:  
- In studies of clinical interaction, expressions of uncertainty among 
physicians are found to be both common (Gordon et al., 2000; 
Menichetti et al., 2021) and uncommon (Tai-Seale et al., 2012). Both 
doctors and patients express uncertainties more often in relation to 
“mental health topics” than to “biomedical topics”, and more often 
for chronic than acute conditions (Tai-Seale et al., 2012:4). When 
treatment outcomes are particularly uncertain, for instance in the 
field of assisted reproductive technology, doctors might commonly 
express uncertainty outright (Menichetti et al., 2021).  
- A vignette-based study indicates that implicit communication of 
diagnostic uncertainty might foster patient trust, confidence and 
adherence more than explicit communication (Bhise et al., 2017).  
- Doctors’ expressions of uncertainty seem to be associated with both 
increased (Gordon et al., 2000) and decreased (Ogden et al., 2002) 
patient satisfaction (the first being a study of clinical interaction, the 
latter a questionnaire study).  
- Uncertainty-utterances by doctors are associated with lower patient 
satisfaction when the physician is a woman (both real and simulated 
consultations) and when the patient is a man (real consultations 
only) (Cousin et al., 2013). 
Our study differs from most previous research both theoretically and 
empirically. Empirically, our data gives us a unique opportunity to 
explore how doctor-patient interaction is actually conducted in social 
situations where “action is carried out” (Jerolmack and Khan, 
2014:202), rather than theorized. To capture the interactional element 
that is often overlooked, we explore what is going on in the interaction 
between the two parties (through dialogues). While doing so, we take 
into account the hierarchical positions held by both parties in the 
medical system, and the pre-set repertoire of culturally shared norms 
and values they are expected to act upon. 
1.3. Conceptualizing clinical consultations 
Doctor-patient interaction is embedded within, positioned and 
inseparable from social context. Although our empirical exploration 
focuses on in situ consultations between patients and GPs as they unfold, 
we situate their interaction in the sociocultural context in which it is 
embedded and explore their negotiation in relation to their institu-
tionalized positions and roles. Apart from being a two-way communi-
cation with exchange of utterances, clinical interaction is also an 
“outcome of the socialisation of doctors (thought styles) and patients’ 
(lifeworld) about an event (illness) within their respective contexts” 
(George, 2017:131). A key element here is the professional authority of 
doctors, which rests on their formal medical competence and the 
assumption that they will employ their skills for the benefit of the pa-
tient (Parsons, 1951). Doctors hold the knowledge with epistemic pri-
macy, but in situations of not knowing, the foundation of doctors’ 
authority and credibility may be weakened. Thereby, the issue of au-
thority and power-distribution becomes increasingly relevant. Despite 
ideological shifts towards patient-centered care, there is little to suggest 
that clinicians are “surrendering their professional authority” (Tim-
mermans, 2020:266). Power- and knowledge asymmetry in clinical en-
counters is a function of the actors’ social and organizational 
embeddedness (Pilnick and Dingwall, 2011). 
In line with these theoretical assumptions, we approach each 
consultation as a co-constructed story shaped by two voices representing 
different epistemologies and different institutionalized positions. While 
negotiating uncertainty, patients and doctors provide, respectively, a 
medical and a lay version of the same event. Regardless of whether the 
two voices align or not; each consultation is one story insofar as the 
voices of both actors contribute to the same story, namely, the one about 
the patient’s illness. 
2. Data and methods 
Our study is based on a narrative analysis of 20 naturally occurring 
GP consultations, sourced from a corpus of 212 consultations from the 
One in a Million: Primary Care Consultations Archive (Supplementary 
Table 1). 
2.1. Data material 
Based on a data-grounded thematic coding of all 212 cases in NVivo 
version 12.4 (Lian et al., 2021), we purposively sampled 20 complete 
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consultations (Supplementary Table 2) that contained minimum three 
total scores on what we defined as 11 patient voice (PV) utterances (see 
Supplementary Table 5). Our sample contains the 10 cases with highest 
total PV-scores (10–19 patient utterances), and 10 cases selected on the 
basis of a maximum variation strategy based on patient and GP gender 
and age; patient education; contact reasons; GP clinics and “usual” GP 
(defined by patients). Among patients we have 10 women and 10 men 
aged 31–84, divided on seven different illnesses categories (Supple-
mentary Table 2). The GPs (aged 32–62) belonged to 10 different pub-
licly funded NHS clinics. Of the 20 consultations, 15 were conducted by 
GPs who had worked in their current practice for more than five years 
(up to 25 years). Because of interesting gender-related patterns identi-
fied in the 212 consultations (total PV-scores were lower than average 
when both patient and GP were men, and higher than average when men 
met women GPs), we organized our sample in four different 
gender-constellations of teams, each represented with five consultations 
(Supplementary Table 2). 
2.2. Data analysis 
Our study is based on an in-depth narrative analysis of verbatim 
transcripts of 20 complete consultations. By narrative we mean taking 
each story (the co-constructed dialogue) as a whole; placing it “in the 
context in which it has been generated and told” (Bury, 2001:281) and 
exploring the ways in which it unfolds. During the analysis we explored 
what was uttered (content), how it was uttered (form) and by whom. We 
particularly looked for the ways in which participants introduce dis-
cussion topics; request and present information and views; propose ac-
tions and conceptualize uncertainty. 
In dialogues, meanings emerge through reciprocal exchanges of ut-
terances that mutually derive meaning from each other. Answers, for 
instance, make little sense without the utterance that called it forth. By 
delinking collectively negotiated chains of utterances in a dialogue, the 
dialogical element is lost. To preserve context and meaning and capture 
the ongoing dynamics of the interactional flow, three complete consul-
tations receive special attention. 
2.3. Ethics 
Our study has received National Health Service (NHS) ethics 
approval (Research Ethics Committee reference: 18/WM/0008; Inte-
grated Research Application System (IRAS) project ID: 232578 dated 22. 
January 2018) and Bristol Data Repository clearance from the Data 
Access Committee (DAC). Ethical and legal issues pertaining to the data 
collection have been previously approved (Supplementary Table 1). In 
this study, we only include participants who in the original study gave 
informed written consent for their data to be accessed and reused by 
other bona fide researchers, subject to NHS REC and Bristol Data Re-
pository approval. All written data were anonymized upon receipt, and 
there was no direct contact with study participants. The main ethical 
issues therefore relate to data-protection. The dataset is stored on a 
password-protected site at the University of York, UK, which is acces-
sible to two researchers only (first and second author). To ensure 
participant confidentiality, we have abided the stipulations of the 
Controlled Data Access Agreement and Data Protect Act. 
3. Results 
To facilitate an in-depth analysis, we zoom in on three consultations 
where uncertainties are particularly pronounced (case 5, 9 and 16, 
Supplementary Table 2). These cases represent different contact reasons 
(neurological, cardiovascular and psychiatric conditions), and different 
gender constellations. In what follows, we present each consultation 
separately, before turning to a more detailed analysis which draws on all 
20 consultations to develop our critical conceptual reflections on the 
ways in which uncertainty plays out in clinical interactions. 
3.1. ”Shooting pains” 
A 58-year-old woman is coming to see her 54-year-old “usual” 
woman GP (case 5, Supplementary Table 2). The patient describes 
debilitating “shooting pains”, mainly in her head and in her right eye but 
also throughout her whole body. Why she gets this pain (i.e., etiological 
and diagnostic uncertainty) is a main theme in their discussions. 
Sparked by a mix of open and closed questions from the GP (“Describe it 
to me” and “Is it constant, or is it intermittent?”), the patient describes 
her symptoms: “Just like an electric shock”; it “feels like a nerve is there 
and trapped”, and she gets it “on and off”. “It sounds terribly unpleasant” 
the GP responds. When the GP asks, “Any ideas what has caused it?”, the 
patient explains she previously was examined for trigeminal neuralgia, 
but no pathology was detected, and that eye specialists found nothing 
wrong with her right eye. All bio-technological tests have failed to 
identify biological pathology, so her pain remains undiagnosed and 
medically unexplained. It is the patient who describes the MRI-findings 
to the GP, who then asks: 
GP: Does that actually mean it’s not trigeminal neuralgia? 
P: I don’t know. 
This reversal of roles happened within the first 3 minutes of the 
consultation. The GP then reads out loud from the hospital discharge 
letter: “I’m not sure we will find a neurological cause” and the neurol-
ogist “thought that there was a reasonable chance it was trigeminal 
neuralgia”, before explaining: 
GP: I don’t know whether we always understand what causes tri-
geminal neuralgia. Sometimes MRI scans show that the blood vessel 
goes very near the nerve and is causing pressure on the trigeminal 
nerve, which leads to the pain. But the way you describe the pain, it 
does sound like a neuralgia. So, in a way, having that report, 
although it’s reassuring that it hasn’t shown anything nasty, it’s also 
left you on the brink a bit, hasn’t it? Because you haven’t really got a 
diagnosis or an answer of what to do about the pain. 
The GP repeatedly conceptualizes diagnostic and etiological uncer-
tainty through both generic (“sometimes”) and patient-specific (“sound 
like”) utterances. She explains that they (doctors) do not always un-
derstand what causes trigeminal neuralgia, and that the lack of patho-
logical findings does not mean the diagnosis is excluded (only that it is 
not confirmed). By explicitly referring to what she heard the patient say, 
the GP acknowledges the patient’s own experiences in her diagnostic 
reasoning. The GP names her pain as “neuralgia”, but this a symbolic act 
because it does not add anything new (neuralgia means nerve-pain, so 
simply a symptom description). The GP explicitly acknowledges that this 
information is not “reassuring” and still leaves her on “the brink”, but 
this is not further discussed. The GP then asks: 
GP: You haven’t got any other ideas about what you want to do about 
it at the moment? 
P: No, I don’t think so. The doctor shocked me when she said, "Have 
you got MS?" in the hospital. I said, "No." 
GP: Why on earth would they associate it with MS? 
P: I don’t know. It’s just what she said. She said, "Is there a family 
history of it?" I said, "No." 
GP: No. This isn’t a symptom of MS. [text omitted] And you haven’t 
got MS. 
P: Fancy throwing that at me. Thank you very much. 
GP: Yes, so that must have been a bit of a shock. 
P: Yes. 
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GP: It’s not still worrying you, is it? 
P: No, it isn’t … [text omitted] 
GP: You haven’t got MS. You’ve actually had an MRI scan, so you 
haven’t got to worry about that at all. 
As expected, asking “You haven’t got any other ideas?” sparks a “No” 
from the patient (it is confirmation the GP asks for). The patient then 
abruptly changes the subject: “The doctor shocked me …”. The experi-
enced GP, who after many years of practice knows a lot about doctor- 
patient communication, immediately picks up on this hint. She ex-
plains to the patient that she does not have MS (an acronym for multiple 
sclerosis, which is a potentially disabling disease of the brain and the 
spinal cord) by referring to the MRI scan. The GP also asks several 
questions to check if she is “still worrying” about it (which reveals the 
GPs interpretation of her utterance). This is the only time the GP asserts 
certainty. However, by doing so, she is willing to risk her credibility 
because an MRI scan is not sufficient to refute a diagnosis of MS. 
Assuming the GP knows this, she finds it more important to ease the 
patients worries than to be medically “correct”. 
After the GP has conveyed the grounds for the diagnostic and etio-
logical uncertainty, she asks: “What do you think we should do next?”. 
The patient answers that she does not want anti-inflammatories because 
of side effects (tiredness): “It’s really not worth it”, and that she does not 
want to use painkillers regularly: 
P: I think I would prefer, rather than take something that I don’t need 
to take every day, just for when it happens, really. That’s my 
thoughts. 
GP: Yes, I think I rather agree with you on that. You don’t want to be 
taking tablets forever and a day, do you? [text omitted] It’s only 
going to be short-term thing, hopefully, isn’t it? 
P: Hopefully, yes 
The patient “think(s)” she prefers medication only when needed and 
emphasizes that this is her “thoughts” (i.e., not a demand), which the GP 
explicitly aligns to. Both agree that “hopefully”, it will to be short-term. 
The GP supplements the patient’s arguments by mentioning addiction 
dangers, and cautiously proposes physiotherapy and acupuncture as 
additional treatment: “It’s almost worth trying something like 
acupuncture, isn’t it? …. It’s just a thought” (same wording as the pa-
tient previously used). By doing so, the GP demonstrates how she seeks 
treatment options which builds on the patients’ skepticism towards 
taking drugs. 
This consultation entails all uncertainty dimensions. Diagnostic and 
etiological dimensions are explicitly discussed; existential uncertainty is 
not. Because the etiology is a precursor to further action, treatment 
options involve prognostic uncertainty, but this is only indirectly 
expressed by the GP (“hopefully” and “worth trying”). The patient seems 
to acknowledge all uncertainties. At least she never says anything that 
indicates otherwise – contrary to the next patient. 
3.2. ”The third vein” 
A 78-year-old man is coming to see his 54-year-old “usual” woman 
GP (case 9, Supplementary Table 2), which is the same GP as in the 
previous case. The patient has had a heart attack, which the GP describes 
as “a surprise” because “You’ve got no risk factors”, and as a result of bad 
luck: “It’s just the luck of the draw, isn’t it?”. The patient suggests a more 
biological explanation: “it presupposes that there is an overriding factor, 
which is presumably genetics”. By uttering this medicalized view on his 
condition, the patient performs the “traditional” role of the doctor more 
than the GP does. The patient opens the consultation by explicitly stating 
what he came for: He wants the GP to translate “into plain English” a 
discharge letter he received from a cardiologist after a triple bypass 
operation. He also wants “reassurance” about what to expect in the 
future: 
P: … it looks as if one is a triple bypass and one of them isn’t [pause] 
one of them is blocked [text omitted]. So, it begs the question, where 
they took the vein out of my leg, surely, they flushed it through, so 
any occlusion that’s occurred has occurred within 12 months of the 
operation, despite all the medication. So, what is the prediction from 
there on? If it’s going at that rate – 
GP: Right, so what you’re thinking is that it’s blocked in such a short 
time, is there a risk that the rest of it’s going to block? 
“The prediction from here” (i.e., prognosis) seems to be what the 
patient came for. His story about his previous heart attack reveals why: 
He “didn’t know” it was a heart attack because it was just “a slight 
discomfort”, which he interpreted as indigestion. At the onset of these 
symptoms, his wife “started moaning then, as is usual”, and urged him to 
see a doctor, which he reluctantly did. He concludes his story by a clear 
question: “in future, I’d like to know, if it’s blocking up at that rate, how 
do I know when I do have a heart attack?” Instead of answering the 
question, the GP continues to explain the discharge letter, which she 
calls “gobbledygook”: 
GP: They couldn’t see any decent blood flow through that particular 
graft. I think what happens when they do these grafts is that some of 
them work really well and instantly work, and others just never 
really take on. 
P: The other thing is, it reassures me - well, it didn’t reassure me of 
anything, really, but that’s incidental. The thing is, if there are three 
veins there and they do three, one assumes that the three have got a 
purpose, and if one is blocked … 
GP: What they’ve said here is that the one that’s blocked, the area 
that that supplies is very tiny. 
P: Yes, and it’s an intermediate one. 
GP: What usually happens is that the blood supply that’s provided by 
the other two usually takes over and actually extends, to make up for 
the loss of the one that hasn’t worked. We do see this happening. It’s 
a graft, isn’t it? 
P: Yes. 
GP: It’s a vein graft, and for whatever reason, they don’t always 
work. [text omitted] The thing is that cardiology isn’t an exact 
science. 
The GP conceptualizes prognostic uncertainty indirectly by generic 
utterances and words like “think” and “usually”, and thereby opens for 
other possibilities. She demarcates her zone of expertise by referring to 
the letter from the cardiologist: “the cardiologist thinks that you’re 
going to be alright”. She also appeals the patient to “Be positive, because 
two out of the three have worked”. The patient is not “reassured” and 
describes the GPs explanation as “incidental” (which might also relate to 
the GPs mentioning of “the luck of the draw” earlier). After 13 minutes, 
the patient once again repeats the question that seems to be his main 
concern: 
P: Like I say, how do I know when I’m having a heart attack? 
GP: Instead of saying to the wife, "You mustn’t fuss," you’d be on the 
phone saying, "I’ve got a problem." The fact that the two grafts that 
you’ve got out of the three are working means that the chances of 
you having any further problems are almost nil, aren’t they? 
Instead of answering the “how do I know” (for the second time now), 
the GP advices him what to do if it happens, and quickly adds that the 
chances of this happening are “almost nil”. The patient then confronts 
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the GP with something she previously said: 
P: I hope so. Just going back to the last time we met, you said, "Oh, 
yes, you’re alright. A new ___[pause], and you’re alright for 20 years." 
I’ve only gone a year. I’ve got another 19 to meet your specification. 
After yet again exposing herself to the possibility of being wrong, the 
GP now returns to conceptualizing uncertainty: 
GP: But the other two are working perfectly well, so it may be that 
that graft has failed for some other reason. 
P: No, it’s just that if you design a motor car and decided to put three 
fuel engines in it, you’d – [text omitted] 
GP: But this is living tissue that you’ve cut away from somewhere, 
and it may be that the vein graft didn’t take, and it died. 
P: It may be. 
GP: If the vein graft didn’t survive - because it’s not a lead pipe, is it? 
It’s a living material. If it didn’t survive the surgical transfer, it would 
just close. That isn’t a slow furring up of arteries that happens over 
years; that’s just that the graft didn’t take. 
While elaborating the difference between dead and living material 
(the latter being more unpredictable), the GP also refers to misfortune: 
GP: Unlike mechanism pipes, of course, grafts are living tissue and 
there is a failure rate. So unfortunately, that one hasn’t worked out, 
but thankfully, the other two have. So, it looks like you’re alright. 
P: Yes, that’s fine. Like I say, there’s no problem. I feel alright, which 
brings you back to the original one; how do you know when it ...? 
GP: Yes. 
P: Okay. Sorry for taking your time up 
The inference of the patient’s last words may be “Sorry, you’ve 
wasted my time”. 
By half-way reiterating the question “How do I know when I’m 
having a heart attack?” just before he left, we see that the patient is still 
worrying about a new heart-attack. Perhaps the patient did not get the 
“reassurance” he came for because he expected more prognostic cer-
tainty than any doctor could give. Perhaps he found the indirect and 
generic expressions of uncertainty too vague. Perhaps the gender-and- 
age constellation played a role here: The woman GP was young 
enough to be his daughter (contrary to the previous consultation, which 
was performed between two women about the same age). Or has the GPs 
previous wrong prediction, and her repeated unscientific references to 
luck and misfortune, reduced the patient’s trust in her? After all, why 
should he trust his GP when she already has demonstrated her lack of 
ability to predict future developments? Whatever the reasons were: That 
the GP did not acknowledge the uncertainty certainly did not help. 
3.3. ”In limbo” 
A 61-year-old man is coming to see his 41-year-old “not usual” GP, 
who is a man (case 16, Supplementary Table 2). The patient starts with a 
very open opening-line: “I just thought I’d come and touch base with 
you” (which is probably not related to acquaintance because in the post- 
consultation survey, the patient answered “Disagree” on the questions “I 
know this doctor very well” and “This doctor knows me as a person”). 
During the consultation they discuss a wide range of health problems 
(rheumatoid disease, skin problems, lung problems, walking difficulties, 
muscle aches, tiredness, high blood-pressure, high cholesterol and 
“mood-issues”), including the existential issues they raise. The patient 
says that his wife is “depressed as well”, and thereby indirectly labels 
himself as such. It is the GP who introduces the mood-issue: 
GP: Okay, what about mood side effects? 
P: Yes, mood, I don’t think that’s ever really been- I don’t think I ever 
really get to deal with it, do you know what I mean? Obviously, the 
tablets help. They keep my mood on a reasonable level, but I’m not 
very happy if you see what I mean. And I think that’s more to do with 
the fact that I’m kind of stuck. 
GP: Right. 
P: Does that make sense? 
GP: Yes, yes. 
P: So, I’m sort of stuck because I’ve been in limbo for a while because 
I wasn’t managing the work and the mood thing with that is the fact 
that I was feeling I was failing students. [text omitted] 
GP: Your personal standards. 
P: Yes. I know that that is a problem for me. So, it sounds stupid, 
doesn’t it? You don’t live up to your expectation of yourself. I think 
that part of my mood is around that. 
When the patient presents himself as a failure (“failing students”) 
and that he is “stuck” and “in limbo”, the GP immediately adds “Your 
personal standards”, which hints both to the individuality of such 
standards as well as to the possibility of him setting his standards too 
high. The patient aligns (“your expectations of yourself”) and says he 
needs “to move on” with “some new goals” and “sort of work a new way 
forward”. The GP follows up by introducing the option of counselling: 
GP: … did you ever talk about seeing anyone – 
P: Yes, we sort of talked about it. I have had counselling in the past, 
and I guess, I suppose, yes. I know it does help actually to sit down 
and discuss things. But – 
GP: I’m just thinking, more than that, ways to help you move on. 
Identify and set those goals. 
P: Goals, yes. 
GP: That are realistic to you as well. Because I know what you might 
want to achieve, but it’s what you realistically can achieve. 
P: Can achieve yes. And there’s that disparity between the two. 
Both of them constantly repeat words uttered by the other, particu-
larly “move on”; “goals”; “achieve” and “realistic”. The patient then 
steers the consultation from existential issues to treatment options, and 
explains why he wants to continue taking prednisolone – although this 
might be bad for his already high blood-pressure: 
P: Yes. Well, I think if I was really honest, if you were to say to me, 
“the prednisolone might shorten your life over getting up, feeling 
that much better every day”, I’d take getting up, feeling that much 
better every day every time. 
GP: Yes. 
P: Because as I said, when I’m not taking it, it just gives me that little 
bit of energy. I know we’ve had this discussion before and I don’t 
know whether we ever really unravelled it, it’s that part of the 
condition, I feel is that I’ve just not got the verve, the vitality. 
GP: Yes. 
P: Well, that’s age related to some extent. But I do feel with my 
condition that whatever underlies the rheumatoid has a major 
impact on my vitality. 
GP: Yes. 
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P: Tired, you know. I run out of steam, that’s what happens. I start to 
do something, and I have to stop because I just haven’t got the energy 
sometimes to follow it through. That’s not great really. But definitely 
the prednisolone does improve that. No shadow of a doubt about 
that. 
The patient has “No shadow of a doubt” that prednisolone is 
improving his energy to such an extent that he is willing to risk its 
possible negative effects on his already high blood-pressure, and thereby 
perhaps increase his risk of having a cardiovascular disease in the future 
(his patient record states blood pressure 162/100 mm Hg and a 10-year 
risk score of 21.6%). He also tells the GP that he has stopped taking 
statins, which further add to this risk, and indirectly asks if his muscle- 
pain might be a side effect of statins: 
P: I had a lot of pain up in my shoulders, and also I think I read 
somewhere that muscle pain is maybe one of the side effects. So, I 
thought, “Well, I’ll give it a go”. 
GP: Yes. Because the simvastatin treats the cholesterol, but not the 
blood pressure. But they’re related ___[pause] because it’s all about 
trying to reduce your risk of heart attacks and stroke and that kind of 
event, really. 
P: When I’m feeling well, I don’t sit around, I am active. [text 
omitted] 
GP: Again, I’m not sure how much that alone will lower the blood 
pressure, by itself. 
P: No, I don’t think it probably does because I’ve been doing it all 
summer really. 
GP: Yes. I suppose from my perspective there are two issues that I 
would have with – obviously we need to get your blood tests done 
[text omitted]. If you’re no different off the simvastatin then I’d 
probably stay on it, and positive steps might be an option again in 
terms of referring you back for some counselling.” 
The patient “think(s)” he read that pain “maybe” is a side effect, and 
he does not “think” it “probably” is enough to be physically active. This 
is typical for the ways in which the patient talks: He uses the word 
“think” 30 times during the consultation (on average; twice every 
minute). Only when he talks about positive effects of prednisolone, he 
has “No shadow of a doubt”. The consultation ends with mutual 
agreements regarding further actions (take blood-tests and refer to 
counselling), and a motivational utterance from the GP: “And also rec-
ognising all your other achievements really.” 
4. Discussion 
Negotiating uncertainty involves seeking, obtaining and exchanging 
information, interpreting it, and deciding how to deal with it. The ways 
in which these negotiations are conducted are patterned. 
4.1. Information exchange 
In the three presented consultations, GPs request and obtain infor-
mation from patients mainly by asking direct questions with suggested 
responses. This is consistent with patterns observed in all 20 consulta-
tions: GPs tend to use closed questions when they ask patients about 
symptoms, and more than half of their questions are formulated with 
suggested responses (Supplementary Table 3). 
Patients request and obtain information in various ways. While the 
cardiology-patient (case 9) asks direct questions, the other two seek 
information without directly asking for it: A woman mentions a question 
she received from a hospital doctor about MS, and a man “think(s)” he 
read something about medication side effects. The GPs responded to 
these utterances as information requests, probably because they know 
the ‘discursive frame’ (Snow, 2008:5) of clinical encounters. 
When GPs present information, interpretations and treatment op-
tions, they use a mix of medical knowledge, clinical experience, test 
results and information received from the patient. They present in-
terpretations of test-results by referring to the diagnostic technology as 
the agent (“MRI scans show”), and to those who interpreted the findings 
(“They couldn’t see any decent blood”). Speaking with ‘the voice of 
medicine’ (George, 2017), and within culturally defined “discursive 
opportunity structures” (Snow, 2008:5), they usually talk in a deper-
sonalized manner, without explicitly referring neither to themselves nor 
the actual patient. When they present treatment options, they explain 
pros and cons of different alternatives, and when they suggest some-
thing, they do it cautiously: “It’s almost worth trying something like 
acupuncture” and counselling “might be an option”. Patients respond to 
these suggestions by cautiously presenting their own opinions. 
4.2. Conceptualizing uncertainty 
In all 20 consultations, the GPs express some kind of medical uncer-
tainty. This is in line with some previous research (Gordon et al., 2000; 
Menichetti et al., 2021), but contrary to other (Tai-Seale et al., 2012). 
Usually, they conceptualize uncertainty indirectly and, again, without 
explicit reference either to the actual patient or themselves (neither by “I” 
nor “we”, as in the meaning of “you and me”). With the depersonalized 
“voice of medicine”, they refer to “it” – not “you(r)” – such as “it may be” 
and “it looks like”. In indirect generic utterances of uncertainty, they tend 
to use words like “usually” and “sometimes”. Occasionally, we see the 
subjunctive if (”If it [the vein] didn’t survive”) and references to hope 
(“hopefully”); luck (“the luck of the draw”); the medical profession (“I don’t 
know whether we always understand”) and medical knowledge (“cardiol-
ogy isn’t an exact science”). When they refer to themselves, which they 
rarely do, they usually say “I think”. These indirect utterances are atypical 
ways of expressing no-knowledge: People “regularly convey what they 
know implicitly by stating, telling, assessing, etc. In contrast, what they 
don’t know is typically claimed outright” (Keevallik, 2011:184). By 
avoiding outright no-knowledge claims through indirect utterances of un-
certainty, GPs remain open to alternative interpretations without 
compromising their credibility. Generally, no-knowledge claims might 
function as “devices for getting around sensitive issues, potential blame and 
responsibility” (Keevallik, 2011:184). Expressing such claims directly 
might be difficult for those who hold the knowledge with epistemic 
primacy. 
Despite not having an authoritative position to defend, patients also 
conceptualize uncertainty mainly indirectly, often with words like 
“think”, “maybe”, “probably” and “hopefully”, but occasionally directly 
by “I don’t know” or “I’m not sure”. However, they tend to express 
themselves indirectly on a general basis, so this is part of a larger 
pattern. Because most consultations are GP-led, patients might align to 
the ways in which the GPs conceptualize uncertainty. When patients 
express uncertainty as response to questions, their answers sometimes 
appear as “default” and preliminary in the sense that they later modify 
or withdraw their initial response (from not knowing to knowing). 
Through non-demanding answers such as “I think I would prefer”, pa-
tients confirm that they are subordinately positioned. 
Patterns observed in all 20 consultations are consistent with these 
findings. Most importantly, GPs conceptualize uncertainty indirectly a total 
of 325 times, compared to 19 times directly (Supplementary Table 4). For 
patients, the pattern is opposite: They conceptualize uncertainty indirectly 
less often than GPs (224 times) but directly more often than GPs (40 times) 
(Supplementary Table 4). 
4.3. Patient agency 
It is usually patients who initiate negotiations that deviates from 
traditional asymmetric doctor-patient dialogues. Patients influence 
what to discuss and how to discuss it in all three consultations. Their 
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initiatives, however, vary a lot: One patient steers the direction of the 
whole consultation, one patient in major parts, and one patient only 
towards the end. Patient agency is most constant in the cardiology- 
consultation (case 9), where the patient puts the GP in a role that pa-
tients usually inhabit by being the one who asks questions. By virtue of 
asking, the patient expects that the GP is capable of providing answers. 
When he is not satisfied with the answers he gets, he repeats the ques-
tions. He also confronts the GP with a previously mistaken prediction, 
which highlights what is at stake when GPs utter certainty. The patient 
even corrects the GP when she describes his previous heart attack as “the 
luck of the draw” by offering a more biological explanation: “an over-
riding factor, …presumably genetics”. 
In the two remaining consultations, patient agency is particularly 
visible in relation to agenda-setting and in discussions of treatment 
options. The man in limbo (case 16) introduces discussion topics and 
presents clear views about medication issues. When the patient ex-
presses worries about his situation at work and at home, the GP 
explicitly aligns to his story. While constantly repeating each other’s 
words (“move on”; “goals”; “achieve” and “realistic”), they co-construct 
a consistent story. The woman with the pain generally acts in a more 
traditional patient role by placing herself in a subordinate position, but 
towards the end of the consultation she moves to a more active role by 
expressing clear views about her medication, which the GP agrees to. 
These findings are consistent with our analysis of both the 20 and the 
212 consultations: patients show different degrees of engagement, and 
apart from expressing worries, patients are most actively engaged in 
discussions about treatment options (Supplementary Table 5). 
Although the degree of patient agency seen in our data is a result of 
how we selected our sample (i.e. consultations with particularly 
involved patients), it tells us something important about how consul-
tations might unfold if and when patients are actively engaged: Active 
patients are allowed to set the agenda, and influence decisions about 
what to do next. When they voice their opinions very directly, it tends to 
spark negotiations where patients and GPs mutually build on each other 
utterances. In these cases, GPs explicitly acknowledge patients’ first- 
hand knowledge by affirmative utterances. Motivational and support-
ive utterances from GPs (“recognising all your other achievements” and 
“it’s also left you on the brink” in case 5 and 16) might help patients to 
accept unescapable uncertainty. This is in line with previous research 
who has shown that in the face of medical uncertainty, the main source 
of patient contention is the ways in which doctors engage with patients, 
not the lack of biomedical knowledge per se (Lian and Robson, 2019). 
4.4. Medical uncertainty 
Negotiations with the woman who might or might not have tri-
geminal neuralgia (case 5) reveals the essential role of diagnostic labels 
in modern biomedical health systems. Giving people a medical name for 
their health problems is point zero: The name is the starting point for 
defining, explaining and acting on our illnesses, and for predicting 
future developments. Nameless ailments lack this fundamental starting 
point, and thereby remain indecipherable (Nettleton, 2006). Diagnostic 
uncertainty renders patients’ incapable of making sense of what is 
happening to them, what to do, and what to expect, and it prevents 
clinicians from predicting future developments, which patients often 
expect and sometimes ask for. 
In the cardiology consultation (case 9), prognostic uncertainty is a 
dominating theme. Like most people, the patient would like to know 
what to expect regarding his illness trajectory, but as we see in this 
consultation: Searching for predictability in the face of an open future is 
a daunting task (Beck, 1992). As the story unfolds, we see how they 
struggle to bridge the gap between the unpredictable and the patient’s 
quest for certainty. The discussion about medication versus high 
blood-pressure in case 16 is also about prognostic uncertainty. The pa-
tient has “No shadow of a doubt” about the positive effects of a drug on 
his energy level, which he wants to continue with although it might 
increase his risk of having a cardiovascular disease. In addition, he has 
stopped taking statins which further adds to this risk. In both cases, 
individual prospects are uncertain because of limited medical knowl-
edge, and because predictions about individuals from aggregated data 
about risk-factors and (side)effects of medications are uncertain. 
4.5. Existential uncertainty 
Existential uncertainty, which relates to people as persons and not 
their temporary role as patients, is explicitly discussed only in the case 
with the man in limbo (case 16). The patient describes being “kind of 
stuck” in limbo, and pinpoints his health and his teaching-job as main 
reasons. He describes his future as uncertain, jeopardized by his health 
problems and their related social implications, and that he needs “new 
goals” in his life. When they discuss medication issues, the patient 
explicitly articulates normative existential considerations by weighing 
his present quality of life against future risks of cardiovascular diseases: 
“ …. if you were to say to me, “the prednisolone might shorten your life 
over getting up, feeling that much better every day”, I’d take getting up, 
feeling that much better …. ” His conclusion means: If this offers me a 
better life, here and now, I accept the risk. 
The story that unfolds in this consultation is mainly about existential 
preconditions. The patient describes how his illnesses have breached the 
course of his life in a way that has changed his ways of thinking about 
himself. Biographical disruption (Bury, 1982) and ruptured identity 
(Riessman, 2015) are apt concepts here. His sense of ‘being me’ is 
altered. He is now in a process of re-conceptualizing things he previously 
might have taken for granted, and reconfiguring his sense of who he is, 
and who he may become. 
This case embodies many of the fundamental life-world alterations 
that illness might spark. The enigma of health is that we are most aware 
of it – and understand it best – when we have lost it, or when it is en-
dangered, obstructed or compromised (Gadamer, 1996). This relates to 
our usually “absent body”. Our body tends to recede from our direct 
conscious perception as our attention often dwells on the actions we use 
our body to perform (Leder, 1990). However, it tends to appear again 
from its absent position when it no longer functions as it used to. Un-
derstood from the standpoint of “bodily being-in-the world” (Csordas, 
1999:143), the same argument goes for existential aspects of our lives. 
Illness is a life-changing experience that deprives the ill person from 
taken-for-granted routines and habits and reveals aspects of human 
existence that often go unnoticed. These experiences put us in a state of 
vulnerability (Gulbrandsen et al., 2016) that might alter our sense of 
being in the world, remind us of our finite lifespan, and raise existen-
tially charged questions (Fox, 2000). Apart from in case 16 (“In Limbo”), 
existential uncertainty is rarely explicitly discussed; it usually recedes in 
the background. 
4.6. Interaction in context 
Interactional processes of naturally occurring clinical encounters 
have previously received little attention. By focusing on the interac-
tional moment-to-moment realization of negotiations, we have explored 
what is going on between the two parties in relation to the broader so-
ciocultural contexts in which their negotiations are embedded. As ne-
gotiations unfold, we see how stories are dynamically shaped and co- 
constructed through interaction between two different territories of 
knowledge and through the enactment of specific roles in the biomedical 
system. Stories about patients’ illness thereby emerge as a result of 
communication between the experiential ‘voice of the lifeworld’ and the 
authoritative scientific ‘voice of medicine’ (Mishler, 1984:14). Because 
their interaction embodies their paired institutionalized role-positions, 
their negotiations reflect and create social realities at the same time. 
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4.7. Strengths and limitations 
Working with observation-data prevents us from asking participants 
to elaborate their utterances, and verbatim transcriptions exclude non- 
verbal interactional aspects. Including only 20 cases prevents us from 
exploring differences between subgroups. Possible biases in the data 
relates to recruitment of GPs, who self-selected to take part in the study, 
and participants might have been influenced by being conscious about 
being filmed. However, our empirical data gives us a unique opportunity 
to explore how negotiations of uncertainty actually unfolds in clinical 
interactions. By exploring complete naturally occurring consultations 
with a heterogenous sample of patients, we capture the interactional 
dynamics of negotiations in relation to a wide range of consultation 
aspects and clinical conditions. Contextualising these negotiations en-
ables us to see how the actions of both patients and GPs are tied to their 
different institutionalized positions. Through data-grounded coding of 
all 212 consultations, we are able to relate our in-depth cases to the 
wider dataset. 
5. Conclusion 
All consultations entail some kind of uncertainty, which patients and 
GPs negotiate from their different institutionalized positions in the so-
cial system. As expected, their interaction reflects their asymmetric roles 
and their different territories of knowledge. Both patients and GPs 
predominantly act according to their positions, but patients display 
more varied role-performances, both within and between consultations. 
One of our key findings is that when uncertainty prevails, the GPs 
manage the moral responsibility and accountability of not knowing by 
conceptualizing uncertainty indirectly, and in a depersonalized manner. 
On average, the GPs utter indirect no-knowledge claims 16 times in each 
of the 20 consultations, compared to only once outright. The absence of 
direct utterances of not knowing reflects the culture of medicine, which 
contains a deep-rooted unwillingness to acknowledge uncertainty 
(Mackintosh and Armstrong, 2020). Expressing lack of knowledge runs 
contrary to what is expected of GPs, and by expressing it they run the 
risk of re-positioning themselves from knowledgeable to 
non-knowledgeable (Lindström and Karlsson, 2016). By conceptualizing 
uncertainty indirectly, GPs manage to safeguard against clinical errors 
without compromising their authority and credibility. 
As our consultations unfold, it also becomes evident that medical and 
existential dimensions of uncertainty are woven together in a way that 
makes them inextricably linked, and thereby difficult to differentiate. 
However, while medical uncertainty is continuously discussed, exis-
tential dimensions tend to recede in the background. The absence of 
explicit discussion about existential uncertainty is noteworthy because 
in the case of health and illness, uncertainty is not merely an epistemic 
concern but also an existential one. Clinical practitioners operate in – 
and create – a normative field where they deal with uncertainty on 
behalf of other people (Cribb, 2020). Whether beneath or above the 
surface, existential aspects are integral parts of clinical consultations; 
but by receding into the background, the existential dimension of un-
certainty is lost. Theoretical assumptions about uncertainty that tie 
medical and existential dimensions to positions (i.e., doctors deal with 
medical uncertainty, patients with existential uncertainty), might play a 
role here (Cribb, 2020). By dismantling this tie and acknowledging that 
medical and existential aspects intersect, existential aspects may use-
fully rise to the surface. 
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